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LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
FOR SHUTTLE
James E. Hughes, Manager
LRB Studies 
Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA
ABSTRACT
The Liquid Rocket Booster study was initiated 
by NASA to define an alternative to the Solid 
Rocket Boosters used on the STS. These 
studies have involved MSFC, JSC and KSC 
and their contractors. The prime study con­ 
tractors, Martin Marietta Corporation and 
General Dynamics Space Systems, have 
identified Liquid Booster configurations which 
would replace the SRB's in the Shuttle stack.
The Liquid Rocket Booster increases Shuttle 
performance to 70K LBS, provides improved 
reliability, hold down and verification prior to 
vehicle release, engine out and improved 
abort capability, and is phased into the STS 
launch operations without adversely affecting 
flight rate.
INTRODUCTION
The Challenger accident caused NASA to 
reconsider all possible options for STS boost 
propulsion, including the possibility of replac­ 
ing the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) with a 
Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB). Accordingly, 
studies were initiated in October 1987 to iden­ 
tify two Liquid Rocket Boosterconceptsforthe 
Shuttle. These concepts were to include a 
conventional liquid system using pump fed 
engines similar to those used on the Saturn
vehicles, and a pressure fed system, once 
referred to as the "Big Dumb Booster". The 
prime study contractors, Martin Marietta Cor­ 
poration and General Dynamics Space Sys­ 
tems, were assisted considerably by the ef­ 
forts of Lockheed Space Operations Co. 
(LSOC) at the Kennedy Space Center and 
Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Co. 
(LESC) at Johnson Space Center, as well as 
wind tunnel testing at MSFC, and other sup­ 
port.
The Liquid Rocket Booster was required by 
NASA Headquarters to provide the STS with 
a payload capability of 70,500 pounds to a 160 
NM , 28 1/2 degree orbit with SSME power 
level @ 104 % ( Rated Power Level ). An 
alternate case of 62,500 pounds to a 160 NM 
orbit, 28 1/2 degree orbit with SSME power 
level @ 104 % was also required 
(The larger 70K case covered both needs with 
only a minor difference in Booster length for 
the diameters of interest). All STS require­ 
ments and specifications were to be met, and 
impacts to the launch vehicle and facilities 
minimized. The most important requirement 
was to provide engine out capability, to im­ 
prove the abort capability of the entire Shuttle 
system, and enhance the probability of safe
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Orbiter and crew return in the event of major 
malfunction anywhere in the system. An addi­ 
tional ground rule was adopted which said the 
LRB would be able to be integrated into the 
KSC ground processing flow without interrupt­ 
ing the planned STS launch rate.
BOOSTER SIZING
Initial concerns in sizing the Liquid Booster 
centered around the fact that for all liquid 
propellants considered, the LRB diameter 
exceeded the current SRB diameter of 1 2 feet, 
since all liquid propellants are less dense than 
the solid propellant used in the SRB. 
The Booster diameter is of critical significance 
to the Orbiter wing loads based on the results 
of initial wind tunnel tests at MSFC. These 
tests were conducted with models scaled to 
represent diameters in the 12- 20 foot range, 
and lengths in the 150- 200 foot range based 
on inital sizing performed by both contractors 
for a variety of propellant combinations. Early 
results showed that booster diameters of 14- 
16 feet were probably maximum to avoid 
unacceptable Orbiter wing loads. Also to be 
considered were physical issues such as for­ 
ward and aft External Tank attach point loca­ 
tions, engine nozzle exit plane location , keep­ 
ing engine plumes within the flame trench 
limitations at pad 39 and VAB door clearence.
PROPULSION CONSIDERATIONS 
The only liquid propellant options which ap­ 
peared to offer the total impulse required, and 
stay close to the dimensions of the SRB were 
storable propellants and metallized gels. The 
storable propellant combination 
( N2 04 / MMH ) was baselined by Martin 
Marietta initially in orderto minimize diameter,
but later rejected due to the severe environ­ 
mental and safety problems with these propel­ 
lants in the large quantities required by the 
STS. The metallized gels were also investi­ 
gated, but were rejected due to their limited 
experience and the open technology issues. 
The propellant combination that seemed to 
best fit the criteria at this point in the study 
activity was LOX / RP-1, since a diameter of 
approximatly 15 feet could be accomodated, 
the attach points to the External Tank would 
be in non - pressurized structure, and the pro­ 
pellant combination is one with which NASA 
and industry has a firm technology base and 
considerable engine experience.
Propellant combinations using LOX and Hy­ 
drogen and LOX / Methane were thought ini­ 
tially to require diameters in excess of what 
the early wind tunnel test data showed as 
limits. Additional wind tunnel tests were per­ 
formed, in which the SRB protuberance ef­ 
fects caused by the aft ET attach ring and the 
IEA (Integrated Electronics Assembly) boxes 
were evaluated. These results showed that 
protuberances had a much larger effect than 
was earlier believed; and, if the LRB could be 
made without protuberances adjacent to the 
Orbiter wing, that diameters of up to 18 feet 
were possible without violating wing load con­ 
straints. Due to the operational complications 
of another propellant at the launch pad ( RP- 
1 ), the KSC personnel supported the LOX / 
Hydrogen selection, since these propellants 
are already used for the SSME'S. 
As shown in Figure 1 "Range of LRB Con­ 
cepts" , the propulsion options considered 
both new and existing engines for the pump 
fed concepts as well as a variety of propellant
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combinations for both pump and pressure fed 
designs. Four engines per booster were 
baselined to provide "engine out" capability. 
Existing engines were rejected for various 
reasons - the SSME due to cost and produci- 
bility limitations, the AJ-23 due to the propel- 
lant decision to avoid the highly toxic N2O4 / 
MMH, and the F-1 due to it's 1.5 M Ib thrust 
level where only two engines would be re­ 
quired and would not allow for engine out 
capability. Propane was also considered as a 
fuel, but the severe coking of injectors experi­ 
enced in recently conducted technology tests 
resulted in that fuel being dropped. Methane 
presented an attractive option for a fuel, and 
was investigated fully using the split expander 
cycle engine being considered in the concur­ 
rent ALS propulsion studies by MSFC. Meth­ 
ane was not selected since it offered no signifi­ 
cant benefits over hydrogen in sizing, and it's 
use as a rocket engine fuel is relatively new 
and unproven.
The selected fuel,by both contractors, for the 
pressure fed booster was RP-1, and for the 
pump fed, MMC selected RP-1 and General 
Dynamics, LH2.
Primary reasons for the selection of RP-1 are 
the density and the well known characteristics 
in rocket engine use. The selection of LH2 
was primarily influenced by alternate applica­ 
tions, and the ease of integration at the launch 
pad. Either of these options could be inte­ 
grated into the STS stack and provide major 
advantages over the SRB currently used.
RECOVER OR EXPEND ? 
An analysis of life cycle costs to develop and 
operate the recoverable and the expendable 
Liquid Rocket Booster showed a cost advan­ 
tage for the recoverable case; however, the 
answer is highly dependent on the assump­ 
tions used and the cost sensitivity to such 
parameters as water impact damage (refur­ 
bishment % of new ), flight rate, engine cost, 
salt water compatibility, mission model size, 
etc. [ Note: only ballistic boosters similarto the 
SRB are covered in this study - flyback options 
are not considered.] The pressure fed system 
would have very rugged tanks (rated at 600- 
1000 psi) and would more nearly represent 
the SRB recovery, i.e. the entire stage recov­ 
ered by parachute. The pump fed system 
would have lower pressure tanks which could 
not survive the water impact loads; therefore, 
recovery schemes for pump fed systems in­ 
volved only the main engine portion of the 
Booster, ie a Booster Recovery Module. 
Due to the relatively low engine unit cost fore­ 
cast by the ALS engine contractors 
(approximatly $4M ea), the design impacts 
of incorporating recovery, and the additional 
front end funding required by the recoverable 
concept, the expendable mode was selected. 
The penalty of error in the initial assumptions 
for the recoverable case was also a factor in
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establishing the expendable as the conserva­ 
tive choice. Figure 2 illustrates the sensitivity 
of various parameters used in the analysis to 
life cycle cost.
These conclusions were made for both the 
pump fed and pressure fed configurations, 
however, should future information provide 
some confidence that, for example engines 
can be recovered and refurbished for less 
than 30% of new cost, recovery could be in­ 
corporated into the LRB design. 
CONFIGURATION SELECTION 
PRESSURE FED:
Pressure fed configurations selected by both 
study contractors are LOX / RP-1 systems 
with the LOX tank located forward. Both de­ 
signs use four thrust chambers due to the re­ 
quirement for "engine out" capability. Some 
significant differences exist between the two 
design approaches. The MMC design uses 
Aluminum / Lithium tanks of higher structural 
strength than conventional materials, and has
optimum weight at a tank pressure of approxi- 
matly 1000 psi. This results in a thrust cham­ 
ber pressure of approximately 700 psi. The 
GDSS design uses the more conventional 
2219 T-6 aluminum, and has it's optimum 
weight at a lower ullage pressure. This design 
has an ullage pressure of only approximatly 
500 psi and a thrust chamber pressure of 334 
psi. Both systems are large and require thrust 
levels of 750K - 850 K per thrust chamber @ 
sea level to provide the Shuttle with necessary 
thrust/weight.
The attempt to define what was once thought 
of as the "Big Dumb Booster1' was severely 
complicated in two major areas. First, the 
pressurization system becomes the most criti­ 
cal system on the vehicle, since loss of pres­ 
surization would cause total loss of thrust on 
one booster, and possibly loss of the vehicle. 
The size, weight and complexity of this system 
is beyond what was once thought of as a 
"simple system". Although specific design ap-
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\ proaches differ, both use helium for pressuri- 
f zation of both Lox and RP-1 tanks. The liquid 
.helium is stored in large insulated tanks, 
I heated and pressure regulated before being 
fed to the propellant tanks. These systems 
| would weigh approximatly 25 - 30,000 Ibs per 
(booster, and would require considerable de­ 
velopment before being selected for a flight 
application.
The second area of complexity found in defin- 
jing the pressure fed booster configuration, 
was the propellant tank fabrication. These 
tanks are very large and heavy, with welds 
from 1" to 2" in thickness, depending on the 
tank material. Welding, and verification of 
quality of these welds would represent a major 
challenge, since welds of this thickness in 
Aluminum are not common practice.
PUMP FED:
The pump fed booster designs defined by the 
prime contractors are driven primarily by the 
propellant selected.
The Lox / RP-1 system selected by MMC uses 
four engines providing 685 K maximum sea 
level thrust @ a chamber pressure of 1300 
psia. The engines are gas generator cycle, 
with nozzle expansion ratio of 21/1, providing 
6 degrees of gimbal capability, and a throttle 
range of 65-100%.
These boosters utilize approximatly 970,000 
Ibs of propellant during the 130 sec burn.The 
booster diameter is 15.3 feet, and length 151 
feet (only two feet longer than the current 
SRB). This allows the forward ET attach point 
to be located in the LRB forward skirt, thus 
avoiding the heavy internal ring frames that
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would be necessary with this attach point in 
the tank area.
The MMC design uses the Aluminum - Lithium 
alloy "Weldalite". The LOX tank is located 
forward and the RP-1 tank aft. This was pre­ 
ferred by MMC to avoid the structural load 
problem that would be introduced in the aft 
booster / external tank strut with a cryogenic 
aft, ie both ends contract during propellant 
loading.
The Lox/ LH2 system selected by GDSS uses 
four engines providing 515 K Lbs.maximum 
sea level thrust @ a chamber pressure of 
2250 psia. The engines are gas generator 
cycle, with nozzle expansion ratio of 20 /1, 
providing 6 degrees of gimbal capability, and 
a step throttle range between 75-100% Rated 
Power level.
These boosters utilize approximatly 692,000 
Ibs of propellant during the 153 sec burn. The 
booster diameter is 18 feet, and length 178 
feet. External Tank attach points are located 
such that internal ring frames are required in 
the booster tanks where these struts are lo­ 
cated. The lower thrust levels of the LH2 sys- 
temcomparedtotheRP-1 system is due to the 
much lower gross liftoff weight of the vehicle. 
Smaller propellant loads are required due to 
the much higher performance of the LH2 sys­ 
tem. Figure 3 illustrates the various configura­ 
tions discussed. 
ABORT CONSIDERATIONS 
The most important contribution to the STS 
provided by the Liquid Rocket Booster is it's 
ability to provide abort capability during flight 
times when none exists with the SRB, and 
during other times, vastly improved abort op­ 
tions. The Liquid Rocket Boosters flown on a 
given mission are first verified by static firing at
the acceptance test facility, then when inte­ 
grated into the stack and on the launch pad, 
verified again during the "hold down" period 
before launch commit. Neither of these tests 
are available when using the SRB. During 
booster operation, should a major failure 
occur in any system, the liquid boosters can 
be shut down, and an early RTLS (Return To 
Launch Site) initiated, also not available with 
the SRB. Due primarily to the increased per­ 
formance of the LRB, all abort windows are 
improved. The liquid booster designs all allow 
for booster engine out with abort to orbit capa­ 
bility. Since current STS maximum payload is 
limited by the orbiter landing weight, full mis­ 
sion capability with engine out is inherent with 
liquid boosters.
ALTERNATE APPLICATIONS 
The LRB would provide an excellent booster 
for other applications in addition to the STS. 
The Advanced Launch System (ALS) being 
studied by the USAF and the NASA may use 
a liquid booster very similar to the type re­ 
quired for the STS. Since both of the prime 
LRB study contractors (MMC and GDSS) are 
also involved in the ALS programs, they have 
evaluated the LRB in the ALS application, and 
found a very close match in requirements. De­ 
velopment of a liquid booster that could be 
used on both an improved STS and future 
launch vehicles such as ALS would be mutu­ 
ally beneficial and cost effective. Also, Shuttle 
C would benefit in the same ways as the STS. 
The liquid booster using LH2 when used with 
Shuttle C would also make available a new, 
low cost engine as a possible replacement for 
the SSME.
"Stand Alone" launch vehicles using the STS 
liquid booster were also evaluated, and would
1-14
provide a payload capability greater than the 
current Atlas / Centaur or Titan IV launch 
vehicles.
PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The DDT& E cost estimate forthe liquid rocket 
booster is estimated to be $2.0 B, including 
the engine, with additional cost for modifica­ 
tion of KSC facilities to accomodate the LRB 
and to provide for the transition from the SRB 
to the LRB, while maintaining flight rate. The 
development schedule is estimated at 6-7 
years from go-ahead, based on past experi­ 
ence, and will be paced by the engine devel­ 
opment time. Other changes to the STS such 
as Orbiter cockpit displays, ground and flight 
software, etc. would also be required. With an 
early start, the LRB could be available in the 
mid 1990's for incorporation into the STS. 
SUMMARY
The Liquid Rocket Booster would provide 
major improvements to the Shuttle launch 
vehicle not obtainable in any other way. Pri­ 
mary among these is the increased reliability 
and flight safety through holddown verifica­ 
tion, engine out, and improved abort options in 
all flight regimes. Also the improved perform­ 
ance would allow payloads of up to 65 K to be 
delivered to the Space Station orbit - a signifi­ 
cant improvement over present performance. 
The environmental products of either the RP- 
1 orthe LH2 fueled version of the LRB are also 
significantly less contaminating than the prod­ 
ucts of the SRB, which may become a factor 
in future launch criteria. 
The Liquid Rocket Booster that could provide 
boost propulsion for the Shuttle, would also 
have other applications, and could become a 
major national asset.
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